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POWER TO SUSPEND A CRIMINAL SENTENCE

THE POWER TO SUSPEND A CRIMINAL SENTENCE
FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OR
DURING GOOD BEHAVIOR
By

ANDREW

A.

BRUCE*

S

ECTION" 2 of article II of the constitution of the United States
provides that the president "shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment."
Section 4 of article V of the constitution of Minnesota provides that:
"He [the governor] shall have power in conjunction with the
board of pardons, of which the governor shall be ex-officio a
member, . . . to grant reprieves and pardons after conviction of

offenses against the state, except in cases of impeachment."
Section 76 of article III of the constitution of North Dakota
provides that:
"The governor shall have power in conjunction with the board
of pardons, of which the governor shall be ex-officio a member,
. . . to remit fines and forfeitures, to grant reprieves, commuta-

tions and pardons after conviction for all offenses except treason
and cases of impeachment."
Section 8496 of 'the General Statutes of Minnesota for 1913
provides that:
"The several courts of record of this state having jurisdiction
to try criminal causes shall have power, upon the imposition of
sentence against any person who has been convicted of the violation of a municipal ordinance or by-law, or of any crime for which
the maximum penalty provided by law does not exceed imprisonment in the state prison for five years, to stay the execution of
such sentence whenever the court shall be of the opinion that by
reason of the character of such person, or the facts and circumstances of his case, the welfare of society does not require that he
shall suffer the penalty imposed by law for such offense, so long
as he shall thereafter be of good behavior."
Section 1 of chapter 136 of the North Dakota laws of 1913
provides that:
"In all prosecutions for misdemeanors where the defendant
has been found guilty, and where the court or magistrate has
power to sentence such defendant to the county jail, and it ap*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
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pears that the defendant has never before been imprisoned for
crime, either in this state or elsewhere (but detention in an institution for juvenile delinquents shall not be considered imprisonment), and where it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court or
magistrate that the character of the defendant and circumstances
of the case are such that such defendant is not likely again to engage in an offensive course of conduct, and where it appears that
the public welfare does not demand or require that the defendant
shall suffer the penalty imposed by law, said court or magistrate
may suspend the execution of the sentence or may modify or alter
the sentence imposed in such manner as to the court or magistrate, in view of all the circumstances, seems just and right."
Similar constitutional provisions and- similar statutes are to
be found in a large number of the American states. Where there
is no statute, has the trial court an inherent power to suspend the
execution of its sentence during good behavior or for an indefinite
period? Are the statutes constitutional? The first question must
be answered in the negative.
In the case of Ex parte United States, Petitioner,' the court,
by Chief Justice White, said:
"Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try
offenses against the criminal laws and upon convictian to impose
the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be
conceded that in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess ample right to exercise reasonable,
that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their
authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion
to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition
urged upon the distribution of powers made by the constitution
will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also is
it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime
is legislative and includes the right in advance to bring within
judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute, elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the
scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve from the
punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods
by it provided, belongs to the executive department. .
.
"If it be that the plain legislative command fixing a specific
punishment for crime is subject to be permanently set aside by
an implied judicial power upon considerations extraneous to the
legality of the conviction, it would seem necessarily to follow
that there could be likewise implied a discretionary authority to
permanently refuse to try a criminal charge because of the con1(1916)

242

U. S. 27, 61 L. Ed.

129,

37 S. C. R.

72.
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clusion that a particular act made criminal by law ought not to be
treated as criminal. And thus it would come to pass that the possession by the judicial department of power to permanently refuse to enforce a law would result in the destruction of the conceded powers of the other departments and hence leave no law
to be enforced.
"While it may not be doubted under the common law as thus
stated that courts possessed and asserted the right to exert judicial
discretion in the enforcement of the law to temporarily suspend
either the imposition of sentence or its execution when imposed
to the end that pardon might be procured or that a violation of
law in other respects might be prevented, we are unable to perceive any ground for sustaining the proposition that at common
law the courts possessed or claimed the right which is here insisted upon. No elaboration could make this plainer than does
the text of the passages quoted. It is true that, owing to the
want of power in common law courts to grant new trials and to
the absence of a right to review convictions in a higher court, it
is we think to be conceded: (a) That both suspensions of sentence and suspensions of the enforcement of sentence, temporary
in character, were often resorted to on grounds of error or miscarriage of justice which under our system would be corrected
either by new trials or by the exercise of the power to review.
(b) That not infrequently, where the suspension either of the
imposition of a sentence or of its execution was made for the
purpose of enabling a pardon to be sought or bestowed, by a failure to further proceed in the criminal cause in the future, although no pardon has been sought or obtained, the punishment
fixed by law was escaped. But neither of these conditions serves
to convert the mere exercise of a judicial discretion to temporarily
suspend for the accomplishment of a purpose contemplated by law
into the existence of an arbitrary power to permanently refuse to
enforce the law."
In the case of State ex rel. Cary v. Languon- the supreme court
of Minnesota said:
"There is a marked distinction between an order staying proceedings after sentence, to enable the convicted party to perfect
an appeal, and an order suspending sentence for no definite purpose
other than to vest in the court subsequent disciplinary supervision
over the conduct of the condemned party for an indefinite period.
It might, in a given case, be an act of mercy to suspend the sentence
of imprisonment or dispense with it altogether; but prerogatives
of mercy are for the pardoning power and not for the courts. In
particular instances the power to hold a suspended judgment in a
criminal case over the head of the convicted party might lead to
abuses of various sorts and reflect seriously upon the administra2(1910) 112 Minn. 121, 127 N. W. 465.
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tion of justice. However the courts of last resort in several of
the stafes sustain this power.3
"We do not decide the question. It is not before us. As
already suggested, there is a marked distinction between an indefinitely suspended sentence and a stay of proceedings for a reasonable time to facilitate an appeal, and the question in the case at bar
narrows down to the inquiry whether the trial courts of this state
have the power, irrespective of statute, to grant a reasonable stay
of proceedings for that purpose. We are unable to adopt the view
of the North Dakota and Nevada courts that such power does not
exist, except as expressly given by statute. Our statutes provide
a nmanner in which a person convicted of crime may obtain a stay
of proceedings as a matter of right; but this does not exclude the
inherent power in the court to grant the same whenever in its discretion it is deemed proper. This the authorities generally sustain,
remarking, in some instances, that it should be exercised with
caution. State v. Vaughan, 71 Conn. 457, 42 Atl. 640; 20 Enc. P1.
& Pr. 1252, 1263, and cases there cited. We affirm the rule that
the trial court has the inherent power, in its discretion, to grant a
stay of proceedings for a definite time after conviction to enable
defendant to perfect an appeal, or to take such other proceedings
as he may be advised are necessary or proper in the protection of
his rights.
"It does not appear in the case at bar whether relator requested
a stay of proceedings at the time of the sentence or subsequently;
but this is not important. During the continuance of the stay he
took advantage thereof, and brought his case to this court for
review. Nor are We to be understood as holding that the court
may, of its own motion, force upon a defendant in such case a
stay of. proceedings, nor in the form of a stay of proceedings in
effect indefinitely suspend its judgment for conviction."
Although there are numerous cases to the contrary, there can
be but little doubt of the force of these distinctions and that there
is no warrant in the history of the English courts and of the development of the English common law for the claim of the existence in the American courts of an inherent power to suspend their
sentences save and in so far as may be necessary to facilitate an
appeal to the higher courts or to the executive clemency or to prevent the execution of an insane man or a pregnant woman, in which
3
The court cites: Note to Ex parte Clendenning (1908) 22 Okla. 108, 97
Pac. 65o, 1g L. R. A. (N.S.) O4i; In re Collins, (19o8) 8 Cal. App. 367,
97 Pac. 188; Mann v. People, (igol) 16 Colo. App. 475, 66 Pac. 452; Allen
v. State (1827) Mart & Y. (Tenn.) 294; Fults v. State, (1854) 2 Sneed
(Tenn.) 232; Sylvester v. State, (i88g) 65 N. H. 193, 2o At]. 954; .State
v. Hatley, (1892) 11o N. C. 522, 14 S.E. 751; People ex rel. Forsyth, etc.
v. The Court of Sessions of Monroe County (1894) 141 N. Y. 288, 36 N.
E. 386, 23 L. R. A. 856; Weber v. State, (1898) 58 Ohio St. 616, 51 N. E.

116, 41 L. R. A. 472; 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. 2nd ed., 313.
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1

last instances it would be used as a means to prevent an act which
in itself would be a violation of the law.
There can, indeed, be little doubt of the distorical accuracy
of the court of appeals of Texas, when in the case of Snodgrass v.
Texas' it said:
"In the early days of England a person upon trial as to his
guilt or innocence was not permitted to introduce any witnesses to
prove himself innocent of an offense charged against him, nor in
mitigation of the punishment. The Crown introduced its evidence
to prove his guilt, and if that testimony showed his guilt to the
satisfaction of the jury, they so found. If the court had a doubt
of his guilt from the testimony, it could not grant a new trial on
this ground. Under this condition the plea of benefit of clergy
arose. It was first\claimed by officials of the church alone, who
claimed the right to be trieq in the ecclesiastical court. This plea
was then permitted to all persons eligible to clerk or other position
in the church,--that is, all men who could write,--and finally
broadened to apply to all persons charged with crime. Not being
permitted to offer testimony showing his innocence on the trial,
nor offer testimony in mitigation of the punishment after being found guilty by verdict, when granted the 'benefit of clergy,'
persons adjudged guilty of crime were first permitted in the ecclesiastical court to expurgate themselves or prove their innocence,
and offer evidence in mitigation. Later the courts that tried the
cases, after verdict, but before assessment of the punishment by
sentence, would permit a defendant to introduce testimony in
mitigation of the punishment to be assessed by the sentence or
judgment of the court, and under this system there grew up the
custom of suspending the sentence until the evidence was heard
under this plea, so that the court might have the benefit of it in
arriving at the punishment he would assess. Upon hearing this
testimony the court frequently refused to inflict the death penalty,
which was virtually the penalty for all felonies, and would only
assess a penalty of burning in the hand to mark the man; later,
burning in the face, and still later sentencing the person adjudged
guilty to transportation to America or some other point beyond the
seas, and other penalties. From this power 6f the courts of England, claimed and exercised in an early day, must we look to any inherent power in a court to ameliorate or relieve any person of
punishment adjudged guilty of an offense. In Chitty's Crim.
Law, vol. 1, p. 624, the rule at that time is said to have been: 'By
the common law . . . the prisoner was not even permitted to cal
4
"Reprieve may also be ex necessitate legis, as where a woman is capitally convicted, and pleads her pregnancy; though this is no cause to stay
the judgment, yet it is to respite the execution till she be delivered. This is
a mercy dictated by the law of nature, in favorem prolis." Blackstone
Com. Book IV. Ch. xxxi, pp. 394, 395.
'(1912) 67 Tex. Ct. App. 615, i5 S.
V. 162, 41 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1144.
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witnesses, ...
but the jury were to decide on his guilt or innocence according to their judgment upon the evidence offered
in support of the prosecution.

And though . . . this latter prac-

tice of rejecting evidence for the prisoner was abolished about the
time of Queen Mary, yet the witnesses could not be sworn on
behalf of the prisoner, but were merely examined without any
particular obligation, and therefore obtained but little credit with
the jury.' In his work he recites that Queen Mary, in appointing Sir Richard Morgan chief justice of the common pleas, enjoined him 'that, notwithstanding the old error (of the law) which
did not admit any witnesses to speak, or any other matter to be
heard, in favor of the adversary, her Majesty being party, her
Highness's pleasure was that whatsoever could be brought in
favor of the subject should be heard.' Mr. Blackstone in his
Commentaries says that, shortly after the Revolution of 1688,
among the chief alterations of the law was the 'regulation of
trials by jury, and the admitting of witnesses for prisoners under oath.' Other learned commentators and writers of that period
could be cited as showing that the 'plea of benefit of clergy,' or
suspending sentence, was the outgrowth of that condition, when,
during the trial, not only was his mouth closed, but the mouths
of all persons who would testify in his favor were also closed,
and this plea or suspension of sentence or reprieve, as it was
called in that day and time, was but a way of permitting those who
would testify in his favor to be heard in mitigation of the'punishment to be assessed, although in the common pleas court on this
hearing they were not allowed to dispute the verdict of guilt which
had been found by the jury, but the testimony was received alone
to aid the judge in passing sentence after the verdict of guilt,
and in mitigation of the punishment. But in the beginning and
for a long time this plea was not allowed in cases except where
the penalty was death, and was never applied to petit theft or misdemeanors. This can have no application to our jurisprudence,
for the jury in their verdict fix the punishment as well as pass on
the guilt or innocence of an accused person. After it became the
law in England that witnesses were permitted to testify on oath
in behalf of a defendant on trial of his guilt or innocence, this
plea and custom rapidly waned, and by statute it was provided
it could not be pleaded in many cases, and finally, in 1827, it was
wholly abolished, and has not been the rule in that country since
that date. Bishop, Crim. Law, sec. 937. Yet we find some trying to work out a theory whereby our courts would inherit that
power from the jurisprudence of England, although it was taken
away from the courts of England nearly a century ago, and'arose
under conditions wholly at variance with our system of jurisprudence."
It is true that in perhaps the majority of the American states
the sentence is determined by the judge within the limits pre-
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scribed by the statute and not by the jury, but nowhere do we
find any basis for the belief that the right of indefinite suspension
was ever claimed by the English courts. Much less then can it
be claimed in the American jurisdictions where we have written
and not unwritten constitutions, where as a rule everything has
been formulated and prescribed, and where the power to pardon,
to commute and to reprieve has been expressly given to the chief
executive or to the boards of pardon. Almost all of the American courts, indeed, which recognize the existence of the power
do so because it is humane and just and has long been acquiesced
in rather than because it has any definite legal or historical sanction."
But what of the validity of the statutes whih recognize or
confer the power? Are they unconstitutional in that they encroach upon the prerogatives of the chief executives and of the
boards of pardon to whom the constitutions expressly grant the
power? Do they, in any sense of the term, give to the trial judges
the power to pardon, to commute and to reprieve?
We believe that they are constitutional. We believe, however, that, with few exceptions, the American courts that have
sustained them have given erroneous or at any rate inconclusive
reasons for their holdings.
'Concerning this practice the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Ex Parte United States, Petitioner, (i916) 242 U. S. 27, 6i L,
Ed. 129, 37 S. C. R. 72, says:

"There is no doubt that in some states, without reference to probation
legislation or an affirmative recognition of any doctrine supporting the
power, it was originally exerted and the right to continue to do so came
to be recognized solely as the result of the prior practice. Gehrmann v.
Osborne, Warden, (1911)

79 N. J. Eq. 430, 82 AtI. 434.

"As to the courts of the United States, in one of the circuits, the first,
especially in the Massachusetts district, it is admitted the practice has in
substance existed for probably sixty years as the result of a system
styled 'laying the case on file.' The origin of this system is not explained,
but it is stated in the brief supporting the practice that courts of the
United States have considered the existing state laws as to probation and
have endeavored in a certain manner to conform their action thereto.
It is true also, that in the courts of the United States, sometimes in one or
more districts in a circuit and sometimes in other circuits, in many instances
the power here asserted was exerted, it would seem without any question,
there being no question raised by the representatives of the United States;
indeed it is said that in Ohio where the power, as we have seen, was
recognized as existing, it was exerted by Mr. Justice Matthews of this
court when sitting at circuit, and there and elsewhere, it is pointed out,
the power was also exerted in some instances by other judges then or
subsequently members of this court. But yet it is also true that, numerous as are the instances of the exertion of the power, the practice was
by no means universal, many United States judges, even in a distric:
where the power had been exerted, on a change of incumbency persistently
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In the case of People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions,
the court held that a statute which in terms authorized courts of
criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentences in certain cases, merely
reasserted a power which was inherent in such courts at the common law, which was understood when the constitution of New
York was adopted to be an ordinary judicial function, and which
ever since its adoption had been exercised by the courts, and that
it was a valid exercise of legislative power under the constitution.
The court said:
"It does not encroach in any just sense upon the powers of
the executive as they have been understood and protected from
the earliest times. The power to suspend the judgment during
good behavior, if understood as explaining a cont on uip,il the
compliance with which the offender would be absolutely relieved
from all punishment and free from the power of the court to
pass sentence, is open to much doubt. The legislature cannot
authorize the courts to abdicate their own powers and duties or
to tie their own hands in such a way that after sentence has been
suspended they cannot, when deemed proper and in the exercise
refusing to exert the power on the ground that it was not possessed. Indeed so far was this the case that we think it may be said that the exertion
of the power under the circumstances stated was intermittent and was not
universal but partial.
"As amply shown by the case before us, we think also it is apparent
that the situation thus described was brought about by the scrupulous desire of judges not to abuse their undoubted discretion as to granting new
trials, and yet to provide a remedy for conditions in cases where a remedy
was called for in the interest of the administration of the criminal law
itself, as well as by the most obvious considerations of humanity and
public well-being,-conditions arising in the nature of things from the
state of proof in cases coming before them which could not possibly have
been foreseen and taken into consideration by the law-making mind in
fixing in advance the penalty to be imposed for a particular crime. And
the force of this conclusion will become more manifest by considering
that nowhere except sporadically was any objection made to the practice
by the prosecuting officers of the United States, who indeed it is said not
infrequently invoked its exercise. Albeit this is the case, we can see no
reason for saying that we may now hold that the right exists to continue
a practice which is inconsistent with the constitution, since its exercise in
the very nature of things amounts to a refusal by the judicial power to
perform a duty resting upon it and, as a consequence thereof, to an interference with both the legislative And executive authority as fixed by
the constitution. The fact that it is said in argument that many persons.
exceeding two thousand, are now at large who otherwise would he imprisoned as the result of the exertion of the power in the past, and that
misery and anguish and miscarriage of justice may come to many innocent persons by now declaring the practice illegal, presents a grave situation. But we are admonished that no authority exists to cure wrongs resulting from a violation of the constitution in the past, however meritorious may have been the motive .giving rise to it, by sanctioning a disregard
of that instrument in the future."
'(1894) i41 N. Y, 2,88. 36 N. E. 386, 23 L. R. A. 856.
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of justice, inflict the proper punishment in the exercise of a sound
discretion. Nor can the free and untrammeled exercise of this
power of the right to pass sentence according to the discretion
of the court be made dependait upon compliance with some condition that would require the court to try a question of fact before
it could render the judgment which the law prescribes. The statute must not be understood as conferring any new power. The
court may suspend sentence as before but it can do nothing to
preclude itself or its successors from passing the proper sentence
whenever such a cause appears to be proper . ..
"The practice had its origin in the hardships resulting from
peculiar rules of criminal procedure, when the court had no power
to grant a new trial, either upon the same or additional evidence,
and the verdict was not reviewable upon the facts by any higher
court. The power as thus exercised is described in this language
by Lord Hale: 'Sometimes the judge reprieves before judgment, as where he is not satisfied with the verdict, or the evidence
is uncertain, or the indictment is insufficient, or doubtful whether
within clergy. Also when favorable or extenuating circumstances
appear and when youths are convicted of their first offense. And
these arbitrary reprieves may be granted or taken off by the justices of gaol delivery, although their sessions be adjourned or finished, and this by reason of common usage.' (2 Hale P.' C. ch.
58, p. 412.) This power belonged of common right to every
tribunal invested with authority to award execution in a criminal
case. (1 Chitty Cr. L. (1st ed.) 617, 758).
"The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as understood when the constitution was
adopted, are totally distinct and different in their origin and nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the
latter was always a part of the executive power. The suspension
of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following
it and all civil disabilities remain and become operative when
judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both the punishment
prescribed by the offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt so that
in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities
and restores him to all civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a
new man and gives him a new credit and capacity. . .
I "The framers of the federal and state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the principles governing the power to grant
pardons and it was conferred by these instruments upon the executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the
words of the constitution were used to explain the authority formally exercised by the English court or by its representative in
the colonies."
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The case of People v. Stickle' follows the reasoning of People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions," both as to the right at
the common law and the distinction between a suspension of a
sentence and a reprieve or a pardon.
In the case of Ex parte Giannini," the statute limited the right
of suspension to the term of the sentence. The court contented
itself with saying that the power conferred by the enactment did
not in any manner interfere with the functions and duties of the
chief executive. It cited no cases and made no argument.
In the case of ln re Hart," a special concurring opinion ignores
under a statute which authorized it during good behavior. The
court said nothing concerning the question of an interference
with the pardoning power, but quoted the language of the case
of People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions,"which intimated
that the power was an original power and so original that the
statute could not restrict it by providing that the judge could not
afterwards revoke the suspension which he had allowed.
In the case of Belden v. Hugo, ' the constitutional question
was not considered. In the recent case of Richardson v. Cominonwealth," the reasoning of the supreme court of New York in
the case of People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions is again
followed.
In the case of In re Hart," a special concurring opinion ignores
the fact that the constitution of the state vests the power to reprieve as well as to pardon in the board of pardons and follows
'See also People ex rel. Sullivan v. Flynn,
io6 N. Y. S. 925.

(1907)

55 Misc. Rep. 639,

9(i9o9) 156 Mich. 557, 121 N. W. 497.
(894) 141 N. Y. 288, 36 N. E. 386, 23 L. R. A. 856.
"(1912) 18 Cal. App. 166, 132 Pac. 831.
'(1I91) 65 Wash. 287, 119 Pac. 42.
"(1894) 141 N. Y. 288, 36 N. E. 386 23 L. R. A. 856.

'(I914) 88 Conn. 5oo, 91 Atl. 369.

(Va. 1921) O9 S. E. 46o.
"(I914) 29 N. D. 38, 149 N. W. 568, L. R. A. I95C 1178.

"1.
A reprieve, from reprendre, to take back, is the withdrawing of
a sentence for an interval of time; whereby the execution is suspended.
This may be, first, ex arbitrio judicis; either before or after judgment;
as, where the judge is not satisfied with the verdict, or the evidence is
suspicious, or the indictment is insufficient, or he is doubtful whether the
offence be within clergy; or sometimes if it be a small felony, or any
favourable circumstances appear in the criminal's character, in order to
give room to apply to the crown for either an absolute or conditional
pardon. These arbitrary reprieves may be granted or taken off by the
justices of gaol delivery, although their session be finished, and their
commission expired: but this rather by common usage, than of strict
right." 4 Black. Com. ch. xxxi, pp. 394, 395.
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the New York court in drawing a distinction between the power
to pardon and the power to suspend a sentence"' while the major"In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Spalding said:
"Neither can I concur in their intimation that, except for imagining
that the law was enacted solely with a view to permitting the defendant
to apply for executive clemency, it would be unconstitutional. There is
a wide difference between the suspension of the execution of sentence,
as provided in this statute, and the granting of a pardon or conditional
pardon. A pardon is a remission of guilt, and a conditional pardon is one
which does not become operative until the grantee has performed some
specific act, or which becomes void when some specified event transpires.
i Bishop, Crim. Law, sec. 914. A remission of guilt reinstates the offender as nearly as possible in the same condition as he would have occupied had he never been charged with committing the offense.
A pardon, releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he had never committed the offense. It makes him, as it
were, a new man and gives him a new credit and capacity. People ex rel.
Forsyth etc. v. Court of Sessions of Monroe County (1894) 141 N. Y.
288, 23 L. R. A. 856, 36 N. E. 386, i5 Am. Crim. Rep. 675. This is not
true of the suspension of execution of a judgment. In such case the
court, in effect, says: This is your first conviction. Your record heretofore has been good. The offense is only a misdemeanor. The circumstances surrounding it and your relations to society have been such as to
indicate that you are not naturally criminal and that you are not likely
to become a confirmed criminal. From these facts it appears that the
welfare of society does not demand that at this time the sentence be executed. The policy of the law is to give every person the greatest opportunity for development that due protection to society will permit him to
have. Hence you are put on probation. The court will see whether you
are disposed to become a criminal and whether in fact you are entitled
to its consideration, and society still be protected. We will therefore not
execute the sentence until we have an opportunity to note your conduct
and learn more of your disposition. Should you be guilty of further infraction of law, and not deport yourself as a good citizen at all times
within the period for which the sentence was pronounced, the suspension
will be revoked, and you will be required to pay the penalty of the offense which you committed and of which you were convicted.
"This does not constitute a pardon, either full or conditional. It does
not absolve him from guilt. It is not a remission. It does not restore to
him his rights as a citizen, or wipe out the record of his conviction; the
defendant enjoys his liberty outside the walls of the jail, yet he remains
under the sentence to which he has been condemned, and may be imprisoned at any time. George v. Lillard, (i899) io6 Ky. 820, 51 S. W. 793,
1011.

"In my judgment, so long as the statute is construed to not extend
the power of suspension beyond the maximum limit of the time for which
the defendant was sentenced, by express terms, and does not permit a

revocation thereof except within such period, it is valid, and not subject to
attack as an invasion of the pardoning power. All that is necessary is
to read and construe the statute as applying only to the time during which
the sentence would have been running, had there been no suspension. It
is then made to harmonize with the modern policy of dealing with criminals for the first time guilty of minor offenses. It gives them an opportunity to prove their worth, and that society will not suffer if the
full penalty is not executed, and it minimizes the punishment rather than
increases it, as is done by the construction given the statute by my brethren."
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ity opinion takes refuge in the theory that it is the duty of the
supreme court, if possible, so to construe a statute as to sustain
its validity and therefore interprets the clause "to suspend during
good behavior" as if there had been added to it the words "and
but only for the purpose of affording to the accused the opportunity of appealing to the executive clemency." It concedes and
holds that at any time after the expiration of that reasonable
period the convict may be rearrested, but evidently fervently hopes
and prays that as long as his conduct is good no one will urge or
take these measures.
These are the leading cases which sustain the validity of the
statutes under consideration. When they premise an inherent power
in the trial courts they hardly seem to be justified by the facts
of history. Some of them absolutely ignore the fact that the
constitutions usually vest in the governor or in the board of pardons the power both to reprieve and to pardon, while the distinction between an indefinite suspension which shall be irrevocable
during good behavior or after the term of the sentence has expired and a pardon is hardly satisfactory.
The real solution of the problem lies in the suggestion of the
Supreme Court of the United States when in the case of Ex parte
United States, Petitionerr it said:
"So far as wrong resulting from an attempt to do away with
the consequences of the mistaken exercise of the power in the
past is concerned, complete remedy may be afforded by the exertion of the pardoning power; and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of penalties as fixed
to be subject, by probation legislation or such other means as the
legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may
be adequate to enable courts to meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be
presented to them for judgment, recourse must be had to Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in the very nature
of things adequately complete."
The solution is to be found in considering the suspension as
a part of the sentence which the legislature has itself authorized.
It must, of course, be conceded that the legislature has the inherent power to define crimes and that it is the imposition of the
penalty that turns a tort into a criminal act. It must be conceded
that it is within the power of the legislature to impose any penalty
it pleases as long as that penalty is not cruel or unusual, and it has
"(i916) 242 U. S. 27, 61 L. Ed. 129, 37 S. C. R.
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been generally held that the test of that which is cruel or unusual
is not the novelty of the penalty but its .barbarity.'
The legislature then can impose a prison sentence; it can impose a fine; it can impose a sentence of imprisonment which shall
not begin to run until a number of weeks after the rendition of
the judgment; it can impose a penalty which shall involve the
mere giving a peace bond; it can impose a penalty which shall be
nothing more than a reprimand; it can provide that in certain instances no penalty at all shall be imposed.
Having created and defined the offense, it perhaps, under the
constitutional provisions, would have no power to grant to the
trial judge the power to pardon the act, that is to say to wipe
away the guilt. If, however, the penalty which was imposed by
the legislature involved no term of imprisonment or no fine, there
would be nothing to reprieve, nothing to pardon, no punishment
to wipe away (as opposed to the guilt) except the suspended
"In the case of State v. Aloilen, (1918) 140 Minn. 112, 117, 167 N. W.
345, the court among other things, said:
"The contention that the penalty fixed by the statute violates the provisions of the constitution against excessive fines and cruel and unusual
punishments for crime is not sustained. The nature, character and extent
of such punishments are matters almost wholly legislative. The legislature may prescribe definite terms of imprisonment, a specified amount
as a fine, or fix the maximum and minimum limits of either, which the
courts are bound to respect and follow. In fact the court has jurisdiction to
interfere with legislation upon this subject only when there has been a clear
departure from the fundamental law and the spirit and purpose thereof
and a punishment imposed which is manifestly in excess of constitutional
limitations. 14 Am. & Eng. Enc. (2d ed.) 436; State v. Poole, 93 'Minn.
148, (1904) xoo N. "W.647, 3 Ann. Cas. 12; State v. Durnam, (1898) 73
Minn. 150, 75 N. W. 1127. The term cruel and unusual punishment, as
used in the Constitution, has no special reference to the duration of the
term of imprisonment for a particular crime, though it would operate
to nullify the imposition by legislation of a term flagrantly in excess of
what justice and common humanity would approve. The purpose of
incorporating that particular provision in the Constitution was to prevent
those punishments which in former times were deemed appropriate without regard to the character or circumstances of the crime, but which
later standards in such matters condemned as unjust and inhuman; such
punishments as burning at the stake, the pillory, stocks, dismemberment
and other extremely harsh and merciless methods of compelling the
victim to atone for and expiate his crime. The intention was to guard
against a return to such inhuman methods. The punishments fixed by
this statute do not exceed the limit of legislative discretion, and the
statute must stand. It is possible that an excessive punishment may in a
particular case be imposed by the court. But that possibility will not
destroy the statute. The sentence may be reviewed on appeal and if
found excessive proper correction may be made or ordered. No sentence has yet been pronounced in this case, and we assume that it will
he in harmony with the special facts of the case. Section 9219, G. S.
1913."
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sentence itself. There is therefore no conflict with the constitution, and the courts have too often confused the power of the
legislature or of the trial judge to pardon, to reprieve, and to
commute with the undoubted legislative power to define crimes
and to prescribe their penalties. Though, indeed, many statutes
have been sustained on more or less mistaken and inconclusive
theories, and still more have been allowed to remain unchallenged,
so far the Texas court of appeals' appears to be the only court
"1In the case of Baker v. State (1913) 7o Tex. Ct. App. 68, i58 S. W.
998, the Texas court of criminal appeals, said:
"While the power of the governor alone, under our constitution, to
grant pardons cannot be questioned, yet it is equally beyond question that
the legislature has the sole power to define offenses and fix the punishment
to be inflicted on the offender. Our Penal Code provides, article 3: 'In
order that the system of penal law in force in this state may be complete within itself, and that no system of foreign laws, written or unwritten, may be appealed to, it is declared that no person shall be punished for any act or omission, unless the same is made a penal offense,
and a penalty is affiaed thereto by the written law of this state. The
power to determine that penalty is not conferred on the executive nor
the judiciary, but is confided solely to the legislative branch of the government, and we, nor the governor, have authority nor power to prescribe to the legislative department what acts of omission or commission
shall be made penal offenses, nor what punishment shall be assessed for
a violation of such penal laws. This power is confided solely to the
legislative branch of the government, and in this act the legislature has
not sought to excuse from punishment any one after conviction and
penalty assessed. As the code has provided in defining principals that
all persons are guilty who act together in the commission of an offense.
and even though one should commit an offense, if another is present and
encourages him in the act he is likewise guilty, which general provision
is applied to and read into each and every article of the Code defining
offenses, so should this general provision in regard to punishment be read
into and apnlied to each article of the code prescribing the punishment
for such offense. Section I of article 2 of the constitution provides
that the powers of the government shall be divided into three distinct
departments. Those which are legislative to one: those which are executive to another; and those which are judicial to another, and no
person being of one of these departments shall exercise the power properly attached to either of the others. And section i of article 3 provides that the legislative power shall be vested in a Senate and House
of Representatives, which together shall be styled 'the Legislature,' and
in article 13 certain powers are specifically conferred on the legislature,
which is to enact laws, and the governor nor the judiciary have no more
authority to invade the power conferred on the legislature than has the
legislature to invade and usurp the power of the governor to grant pardons. The passage of this law, misnamed a 'suspension of sentence,' is
a legislative act, passed within the scope of the power which they and
they alone possess, to fix by law the punishment of any and all penal
offenses.
It does not authorize a jury nor the courts to suspend any
law of this state, but the legislature by law has provided that in given
contingencies no punishment shall be suffered for the first violation
of certain provisions of the Penal Code."
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whicl has satisfactorily faced the issues and satisfactorily solved
the problem.
There is in fact no suspension of the sentence at all. The
sentence is merely conditional and such a one as the legislatur
has prescribed. It is that the convicted person shall not be ir,.
carcerated or fined but shall be held under the surveillance of the
court and of the law. It is much like giving a peace bond. It is
much in common with our statutes against habitual offenders but
includes more of the element of mercy. The prisoner is told
to go and to sin no more, but that if he does sin again, his punishment shall be that which was awarded for the first offense. The
suspension, if suspension it be, must be entered as a part of the
judgment of conviction and as a part of the original sentence. It
can not be allowed on a subsequent petition, for in that case it
would be an exercise of the power to reprieve if not of the power
to pardon.'
There is no real merit in the objection which was raised by
the supreme court of Minnesota in the case of State ex rel. Cary
v. Languan, that:

"In particular instances the power to hold a suspended judgment in a criminal case over the head of the convicted party might
lead to abuses of various sorts, and reflect serious results upon
the administration of justice."
These words, indeed, were used in connection with the contention
of an inherent power on the part of the courts to suspend a
sentence and not in connection with a power which was given by
statute and which was given as a part of the penalty. In answer to the contention some courts intimate that such a suspension would be invalid against the opposition of the defendant;
but even this concession appears to be unnecessary. The fundamental question would be-whether the suspended sentence was itself cruel or unusual. It could only be revoked in case of bad
behavior, and on that charge the defendant would have a day in
court. If there were no new offense there would be no penalty.
The safeguard would exist in the construction of the term bad
behavior. We are satisfied that the construction which would be
given would require a violation of the law to be proved. The
Standard Dictionary in fact defines "during good behavior" as
"while conducting oneself conformably to law."'
'State of Indiana v. Smith, (19o9) 173 Ind. 388, go N. E. 607.
"(i91o) HI2 'Minn. 21, 127 N. M'. 465.
21United
States v. Hraskey, (1887) 120 Ill.
56o, 88 N. E. 13o A. S. R.
288.
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There can be no doubt of the wisdom and of the imperative
necessity' of granting our trial judges the power to suspend sen"In 1918 the United States Census Report on Prisoners and Juvenile
Delinquents was given to the public and although this report was much
belated and was based on the figures and investigation of the year of
igo, it contained much valuable information and is well worth considering. In speaking of it Miss Edith Abbott, on September 3, i919, in
an address before the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology said:
"The recently published Jnited States Census Report on Prisoners
and Juvenile Delinquents contains important data with regard to the
need for adult probation in the United States. This report shows that
several hundred thousand persons each year experience the demoralization of a short sentence in one of our minor prisons and that nearly three
hundred thousand persons are committed annually for the non-payment
of fines.
"This Census Report presents, for the first time in this country,
statistics showing the total number of persons imprisoned in a given
year for the non-payment of fines. The report shows that 58 per cent
of all the persons committed to prison in our country are committed
not for their crimes, but for their poverty, because they were too poor
to pay the fines imposed by our courts. The extent of this modem
system of imprisonment for debt is shown by the following figures: In
a single year, 291, 213 poor persons were imprisoned for non-payment
of fines, and among them were more than 6,ooo children of juvenile
court age (seventeen or under). For inability to pay fines of less than
$5, 35,363 pbrsons Were imprisoned, and 129,713 for fines of less than
$ O.

"Imprisonment for non-payment varies in different sections of the
country and is, of course, more common in the South than in the North.
Sixty-eight per cent of all prisoners in the South Atlantic States are
committed only for inability to pay fines, and the percentage falls to
48 per cent in the Middle Atlantic States and to 43 per cent in New England.
"To members of this Institute, to those who know the noisome,
verminous, dark, ill-ventilated local prisons to which these persons are
sent to spend their time in idleness and demoralizing companionship, the
cruelty and waste of such punishment is obvious.
"These facts as to the extent of imprisonment for the non-payment
of fines should be the more carefully considered in our country in view
of the fact that the whole evil system has been practically swept away
in Great Britain by the successful operation of the Criminal Justice
Administration Act of 1914. In democratic America it appears that in
the second largest city in the country the judges are still sending annually to the city workhouse from ten to twelve thousand persons who
are too poor to pay their fines, and in the country as a whole more than
290.000 persons suffer this imprisonment for poverty in a single year;
while Great Britain has adopted the more efficient and humane policy
of doing away with the last surviving remnant of the mediaeval system
of imprisonment for debt. Since 19o5, it had been optional with the
British courts to give a man time to pay his fine, but in 1914 it ceased
to be optional and became mandatory. The first section of the Criminal
Justice Administration Act of 1914 provides that in all cases time must
be given for the payment of fines and the time must not be less than
seven clear days. At the end of this time further time may be allowed
by the court and payment in installments may be allowed. The Act con-
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tences and of the social need of the statutes to which we have
referred, and which we believe to be constitutional.
tains the further humane provision that in imposing a fine the court is to
take into consideration 'the means of the offender so far as they appear
or are known to the court.' This provision puts an end to what the
Prison Commissioners for Scotland called the 'abuse which .

.

.

. arises

from the imposition for certain offenses of fines upon a stereotyped
scale, which necessarily press much more hardly upon the very poor
than upon those who are better off.' Reports of the three Prison Commissions of England, Scotland, and Ireland all testify to the beneficial
results of the Act of 1914 in operation. The experiment appears to have
been entirely successful during the five years that have elapsed since
the Act became effective.
"A twin evil that has recently been abolished in Great Britain is the
short sentence. The Criminal Justice Administration Act of -1914 contains two provisions designed to do away with short and useless sentences
of imprisonment: (i) The courts are given power to substitute for a
sentence of imprisonment, an order that the offender be detained for one
day within the precincts of the court. (2) If a sentence of imprisonment does not exceed four days, the offender is not to be sent to jail, but
is to be detained in a 'suitable place' certified as such by the Home Secretary. The Commissioners of Prisons for England and Wales emphasize
in their 1915 report.the importance of the Act of 1914 in preventing the

development of a criminal class. As to the short sentence they say that
it has not a 'single redeeming feature.' 'It carries with it all the social
stigma and industrial penalties of imprisonment with no commensurate
gain to the offender or the community. If there still survives in the
minds of administrators of justice the obsolete and exploded theory that
prison is essentially a place for punishment-and for punishment
alone-for the expiation of offenses in dehumanizing, senseless tasks,
and arbitrary discipline truly there could be devised no more diabolical.
form of punishment than the short bentence oft repeated.'
"In America the short sentence, like imprisonment for fines, is still
with us. The recently published Census Report shows that 24,970 persons were given sentences of less than ten days in our county jails alone.
In the municipal jails, it appears that 4,53 persons were sentenced to
terms of imprisonment of four days or less than four days. It may be
asked what the Committee on Probation has to do with the problem of
the short sentence or with imprisonment for the non-payment of fines.
The answer is, of course, everything, for probation is the accepted American substitute for these evils."

